The chapters on epidemiology provide an outline-as would be expected from the titles-and a very careful discussion of categories of somatoform disorders, with a review of alternatives and a very thorough consideration of terminology. Similarly, although they have used the label of medically unexplained symptoms in the title and in one of the chapters, they discuss its disadvantages and describe it as a negative statement from the clinical point of view: "withholding from the patient that which he or she usually seeks-a positive explanation for their symptom(s) and support." p 44 Thus they indicate that conceptually, referring to a symptom as medically unexplained is ambiguous. Terminology is evaluated, followed by a discussion of terms, such as somatoform disorder, functional somatic syndromes, together with the history of current classification especially the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), Third and Fourth Edition, with brief mention of the International Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision, and emphasis is laid on the value of including positive psychobehavioural criteria for current diagnosis in this group of diagnoses.
Views of alternative themes are provided, such as selffocused attention, overinterpretation of bodily symptoms, relation of ideas to symptom in somatization, selfconcept of bodily weakness, expectation of memory, health anxiety and health concerns, abnormal behaviour, avoidance of physical activity, and personal problems. They also discuss 2 new proposals for the classification of clinically significant medically unexplained symptoms, namely, complex somatic symptom disorder proposed by the DSM-5 and bodily distress syndrome (BDS). Conceptual issues are treated thoroughly, and while Chapter 2 is heavy going, it thoroughly deserves time and attention. No firm strong favourites really seem to emerge regarding classification, except that they do consider that the 2 new proposals, complex somatic symptom disorder and BDS, are improvements in many respects. Without apparently adopting this specific concept of BDS, the authors therefore have decided to use the term BDSs as an umbrella term for the largely ill-defined group formerly called medically unexplained, somatoform, or functional symptoms.
The subsequent chapters provide helpful discussions against this background. All chapters give adequate references, and the first 2 give exceptionally thorough and well-chosen observations on the thorny diagnostic issues around this whole topic of psychosomatic illness.
Pain and its psychological relations, immense subjects in their own right, are not specifically treated, for the most part, except in the discussion of terminology and-briefly-pain disorder, although pain crops up in quite a few of the themes under consideration, especially in Chapter 2. One of the themes, from time to time, relates to medically unexplained symptoms or other terms that bring in examples of psychogenic pain (a term the authors themselves rightly avoid).
The authors tend, on the whole, to accept the idea that most of the symptoms under consideration have an important psychological element. I felt that they did not, perhaps wisely, attempt to make a strong distinction between the possible contribution of emotional factors to causing the pain or any other symptom, rather than the obvious tendency for many symptoms to become better explained as knowledge of possible organic bases improves. In the field of pain, there has been a very clear tendency for symptoms to be too freely interpreted, so that psychological causes were overemphasized as factors in producing physical symptoms, an error that was easily made by myself and others, and that I hope in time will diminish in frequency. The historical pattern of explanation of psychosomatic symptoms has changed as understanding has advanced. Such conditions as irritable bowel syndrome, whiplash, lower back pain, and irritable bladder syndrome often have clear explanations in their physical origins, perhaps only denied through lack of knowledge or the influence of insurance examiners.
Being aware of the strength of these factors in many jurisdictions, some scientific investigators have abandoned the idea that severe or moderately severe pain has important psychological causes and perhaps in time the same may appear with other psychosomatic complaints. Complaint behaviour will, of course, always need to be understood-at least, in part, in terms of psychological considerations.
Notwithstanding these specific reservations, this book is very highly recommended as a learned and thoughtful contribution to an important topic in general psychiatry and the relation of psychological explanations and management to specific illness.
of neurosis narrowed and became restricted to purely psychogenic disorders of no known anatomical cause. Psychosis then came to mean nonneurological (as distinct from dementia or epilepsy) disease of the brain. Psychoses were assumed to have a somatic cause that investigators could search for and ultimately discover. Neuroses were considered developmental processes that needed to be investigated in another way-they needed to be psychologically understood, one person at a time.
The connotation of the terms underwent several changes and, in 1980, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), Third Edition, dispensed with them altogether, at least as they pertained to classification of illness. The term psychotic now referred to psychotic symptoms (for example, delusions and hallucinations), which can emerge in the context of many different disorders. One inference is that these particular symptoms have discoverable brain causes that can be found and eliminated, that trying to understand the meaning of these particular symptoms is like trying to understand the pain of a broken leg, not germane, in other words, to healing.
One school of thought, phenomenology, would still, however, consider the experience of such symptoms of paramount importance. Do delusions and hallucinations lead to cognitive chaos, to terror, amusement, fury, fascination, or preoccupation? Perhaps psychotic states can be best differentiated according to the patient's inner experience-perhaps only then will categories of psychic illness correspond to specific etiologies and specific treatments.
These thoughts are off topic. This book does not classify psychosis according to its effect on the patient. The classification used here is a traditional division of disorders: neurodevelopmental, neurodegenerative, focal, malignant, infectious, endocrine, metabolic, nutritional, autoimmune, and others in which psychotic symptoms can occur. The descriptions are thorough and take up 170 tightly written pages in Section 1. Section 2 deals with history and examination (including probe questions designed to elicit symptoms), investigations, clinical clues, and classification of psychoses of unknown origin. The book closes with an appendix on relevant changes proposed for DSM-5: new psychosis risk and olfactory reference syndromes, the omission of bizarre delusions and disorganized behaviour as criteria for schizophrenia, the abolition of schizophrenia subtypes and the category of shared psychotic disorder, the recognition that psychotic depression is not always severe depression, the collapse of Axes I, II, and II into one, relabelling of dementia, and reconsideration of catatonia. It will be interesting to see how many of these proposals will be approved. The schizophrenia risk syndrome has already been decided against.
This book is well-referenced, comprehensive, and up to date-an excellent reference book about the diagnosis of psychosis for all physicians, especially neurologists and psychiatrists. The title of this book intrigued me. As a physician and psychiatrist specializing in addiction, I have read about the promises of neuroscience research and eagerly anticipate a broader range of effective clinical applications. I must confess to have not given much thought about the perils of such research! The book is an updated version of a doctoral dissertation by the lead author, building on Dr Wayne Hall's interest in ethical, social, and policy issues. Dr Hall is the Director of the Addiction Neuroethics Unit at the University of Queensland.
Part 1 reviews "The Science of Addiction" and particularly the attempts to answer whether addicts are able to control their drug use. The neurobiological underpinnings include genetic research, molecular and cellular effects of drug use, and the functional neuroanatomical changes and their impact on cognition and decision making. The authors warn that neuroscientific approaches applied to a highly stigmatized condition could lead to unjustified invasive procedures, such as the reported experimental stereotactic ablations of the nucleus accumbens and cingulate gyrus in Russia and China. They also caution against the risks of deep brain stimulation or transcranial magnetic stimulation.
Part 2 reviews the principles of an ethical analysis and in particular the impact that addiction has on the autonomous decision-making capacity of people. The requirements of informed consent to treatment and the ethical acceptability of coerced treatment are explored. Neuroscience research does not prove that people who have addictions lack autonomy except for episodes of impairment, such as during withdrawal or intoxication. The aim of treatment should be to increase patient decision-making capacity.
Part 3 recognizes that, through neuroscience, treatments are more targeted to specific neurobiological deficits, with fewer side effects and may become more personalized. History is, however, littered with premature therapeutic enthusiasm. Novel anti-craving drugs, drug vaccines, depot medications, and drug implants could be abused by a public desiring to reduce social harm and punishing
